ment, known as the Oath, in which the medical man promises to conform to a certain code of conduct. But we do not know whether all phvsicians took this oath, still less if any penalties attended its violation. But all the facts point to there being no penalty. There is for instance in the Hippocratic collection a treatise the writer of which describes without shame his efforts to produce abortion in a patient, an act of which the taker of the Hippocratic oath swears he will never be guilty. There is no recorded instance of a man being expelled from the profession for unprofessional conduct. Nobody, so far as we are aware, had anything to fear from a General Medical Council. The age of trade unions was not yet. Neither had public opinion any strong influence upon professional conduct. Another tract in the Hippocratic collection, the Law, remarks that the only penalty inflicted on sinning doctors was lack of respect, and that this was no penalty at all, as quacks made a living out of it. In other words, a man so lost to shame as to transgress the laws of medical morality had no further check; he forfeited the respect of decently educated people, but did not care about it, as quackery was as profitable as scientific medical practice.
Modern parallels are not far to seek. There is as big a fortune in quackery as in a Harley Street practice, and an unscrupulous man driven from the latter may confidently hope to recoup himself if he have the wit to advertise a patent medicine. He may have lost what most men prize above riches or above even life itself, but if honour does not keep a man straight, to live without it in affluence is no great hardship. The way of the transgressor is made as hard as possible, but he can often find a refuge from hardship in disreputable but lucrative practices. When we have expelled a practitioner from the profession there are still avenues open to him; in the ancient world there was no chance of preventing his practising, and to violate the medical code scarcely did him any material injury at all.
But there were forces at work in the ancient world which tried to keep up a high standard of medical honour. The charlatan was one thing, the respectable physician another. To what did these forces appeal? The answer is typical of the ancient-particularly of the Greek-mental attitude towards moral problems generally. Appeal was made to the artistic instinct. A true Greek loved his craft, whatever it was. For the honour of the craft he would do much that he would do for nothing else. " Love of the art," says Precepts, " and love of mankind go together." It will be said that such a sanction is but a feeble one, and incapable of resisting an appeal to the instincts of avarice or lust. That many would yield to the temptations is obvious, but we must not forget that the best sort of Greek was an artist first and a man afterwards. Nothing is so striking in the history of antiquity as the persistent refusal of the Greek to put sensual pleasure, or even physical comfort, before the satisfaction of the artistic sense.
It has been thought that besides this sanction a medical guild exercised control over practitioners, and forced them to observe a decent! standard of morality. But there is no evidence that the Asclepiadoe, as they were called, could effectively control practising physicians, nor is there any reason to believe that the violation of the Hippocratic Oath was followed by deterring penalties. There were only two deterrents, the law of the State and the doctor's love of his craft. Of the two the latter was by far the most important, the former -coming into action only when some crime or serious wrong (murder, adultery, &c.), had been committed. To sum up, modern etiquette protects the interests of both patients and the profession, and is enforced by penalties of various degrees of severitv exercised by the organized profession; Greek etiquette protected the patient where the law was not effective, and appealed to the artistic instinct without imposing penalties.
So far as I know, the only sources for Greek etiquette, with the exception of a few scattered allusions, are four small tracts in the Hippocratic collection -Oath, Decorum, Law, and Precepts. Considerable controversy has raged over the date of the first of these, but opinion is tending towards an Alexandrine or even later date for at least a great part of it. The other three have been strangely neglected, but I cannot imagine a competent scholar assigning to any of them a date earlier than the third century B.C. It seems, therefore, that for two centuries, from 500 to 300 B.C., during which period there flourished all that was best in ancient Greece, nothing was written, .or at least nothing has come down to us, bearing on the question, of medical etiquette.
In itself this is an interesting and possibly a significant fact. It may well be that during the really great period of Greek civilization, while the Hippocratic school flourished and the age of decadence had not set in, no need was felt to formulate a code of etiquette, just because it was in general instinctively obeyed, or perhaps because the big, general principle that a physician's duty is to help, or at least do no harm, to suffering humanity-so the great Hippocrates himself has expressed it-was considered a sufficient guide and check to control a practitioner's actions. Personally I am inclined to the latter view. It is typical of Greek thought at its best not to trouble about changing and non-essential details, but to lay down firmly first principles. Grasp these, thought the Greeks, and all the rest can be derived by an intelligent man through the process of deduction.
The lack of references to etiquette in the earlier treatises of the Hippocratic collection and the insistence upon it in the later may be connected with the decline in the dignity of the profession. As the status of medicine fell less desirable characters became doctors, and those who cared for " the art," as it was always called, became desirous of raising the moral tone, and set down rules in writing. It is interesting to note that Precepts, the great repository of etiquette, is certainly very late, and was probably written by a Roman. Now at Rome medicine was a far less dignified profession than it was in Greece, practitioners in the ordinary sense being rare; medical treatment was usually the task of slaves. It is at least a strange coincidence that Dr. Singer, who, has made a special study of the Oath, thinks that it, too, was compiled in its final state at Rome.
There is no Greek word exactly corresponding to the English word etiquette." There is nothing unnatural in this, as ancient conditions were fundamentally different from modern. The unwritten laws, however, which the physician ought to obey were summed up in the word EvvO0'XflFOvvU7, "that which is seemly and gracious," " decorum," " the behaviour of an artist and a gentleman."
I will now enumerate the acts which the evao-Xpawv was debarred from committing, and what course of conduct he was expected to pursue. Many aspects of decorum would now be criminal or at least civil offences, while others would be merely questions of good manners or ordinary decency. Herein lies one of the fundamental differences between ancient and modern etiquette: the former is far wider than the latter, and while its powers were less its duties were far greater. Ancient etiquette did not rely on the categorical imperative, but it embraced the whole duty of a physician.
(1) The physician should neither give poison nor sanction the giving of poison.
(2) He ought not to encourage abortion.
(3) He ought not to abuse his position to debauch any member of a patient's household.
(4) He ought not to give away information about the patient, whether that information is acquired in the course of his profession or in the ordinary intercourse of society. This last point is one to which I would draw particular attention.
(5) He ought not to advertise.
The following are the positive rules he should obey:
(1) He should call in a consultant if in doubt or perplexity.
(2) He should be reasonable in his fees, and, if necessary, forgo them altogether.
(3) He should lead a pure and moral life, and should try to be, in the highest and widest sense of the word, a philosopher.
(4) He should avoid all ostentation in dress or manner, and try not to annoy the patient with unnecessary noises or odours, particularly those of wine.
I must remark here that there are a few points of etiquette that I have purposely omitted, as I hope to discuss them later; further, we cannot be sure that all these points of etiquette were a living force at one and the same time. Our evidence is far too scanty to allow us to be positive, though it is probable that they all gradually grew up together and came into vogue because of their obvious wisdom.
It should be noticed that while none of these clauses has as its object, or at least as its first object, the welfare and dignity of the profession, yet there is nothing startling in them; they are very much the kind of code a respectable physician would follow nowadays. Indeed in some respects the likeness between ancient and modem is sometimes almost ludicrous.
The ancients did not advertise by appeals to the eye, but by appeals to the ear. They delivered a speech or a lecture, just as on a lower level a cheapjack holds forth at a fair. I was vividly reminded of a modern advertisement the other day on re-reading the following passage from Precepts:-" If for the sake of a crowded audience you wish to make a display, your ambitioni is no laudable one, and at least avoid all quotations from the poets, as all such manifest feebleness of industry. I deprecate these far-fetched efforts, as the poetry is attractive only in and for itself. To use poetry as an advertisement of your skill is to imitate the labour of a drone, and to win the spoils of a drone."
In other words, poetry and sentiment have nothing in common with medicine or with the skill of a physician. The excellence of the poetry is no proof of the skill of the doctor nor of the value of the medicine. Thinking men saw through the fallacy as easily then as they do now, but the common herd were as easily duped in 300 B.C. as they are in 1923.
I would call your attention, however, to the fact that the ancient doctor was not forbidden to advertise; he was only warned that to do so was unseemly, and derogatory to the art. Every point of ancient etiquette proper is introduced by a "should" or an "ought," never by a "must." Etiquette was merely " good form."
Less blatant advertisements appear to have been not uncommon and more or less tolerated in spite of the rule of etiquette. There are still surviving inscriptions in honour of physicians who had given their services gratis to the state in times of emergency, and it is not taking too low a view of human nature to suppose that the generous physician was not blind to favours to come.
The temples of Asclepius, the relation of which to rational medicine is still somewhat doubtful, being in part hydropathic establishments and in part resembling Lourdes, were covered with advertisements. Grateful patients seem to have been compelled, or at least strongly persuaded, to put up inscriptions describing their cures, the modern analogue being the unsolicited testimonials with which we are so familiar in our patent-medicine advertisements.
There is one piece of etiquette-ancient etiquette I mean-which I have not vet mentioned. It is deeply interesting, but its history is shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. We know from Galen that in the Rome of his day it was considered unprofessional to operate. The Hippocratic Oath contains a clause in which the future physician promises to abstain from operating. This clause is supposed by some to be late, and indeed it is most unlikely that any such promise held good in the great period of Greek medicine. As far as we can tell from the Hippocratic writings, during this period (roughly 500-300 B.C.) physicians operated without fear or scruple. When did this sharp severance of surgery and medicine take place? We do not know for certain, and we can only guess. It was probably somewhere between 300 B.C. and A.D. 100. One thing is clear. No such cleavage could have taken place when the practice of medicine was in a flourishing and healthy state. The idea that there is something degrading in manual work is a sure sign of decadence. I have long pondered over this problem, and tried to find a reason for the separation of medicine and surgery which should not be a slur upon both.
Was it because of the difficulty of surgery ? But it was not too difficult for the great Hippocrates, who mastered it and practised it with the most wonderful success. Was it because surgery was " messy" and disagreeable in pre-anesthetic days? Again, the Hippocratics did not think so, nor would any one of sound medical opinion. Was it because of the dangers of operating in days when antiseptics were unknown? But the dangers were no greater than they had ever been, and danger would only justify a medical man in being careful and not operating unless otherwise death were a certainty. It would in no circumstances justify a promise never to operate. I am aware that many scholars have supposed that the clause in the Oath only applies to one operation, that for stone, while others make it refer to castration, and not to operative surgery. I must point out that the Greek permits of neither of these views, which are also incapable of being reconciled with the statement of Galen. In other words, the historian is forced to admit that at one time between the two dates I have mentioned the medical profession had sunk very low, and certain duties were regarded as common and unclean, to be relegated to inferior members. It is indeed shocking to think that surgery was ever considered undignified. E`o'xrjX7oo'6vvq told you what you ought to do, not what you mutst do under threats of pains and penalties. It is not surprising, therefore, that it included very much that nowadays would not be considered etiquette, but rather would come under the category of bedside manners, Some of our authorities go into this question with a wealth of detail which is sometimes rather amusing.
Great stress is laid on politeness, urbanity, reserve, restraint in talk, gravity, neatness and sobriety of dress, and it is hinted that the practitioner should refrain from wine while making his rounds. He is to show calmness, authority and quietness, and in particular he is to speak about the patient and his illness as little as possible consistent with the necessary instructions to the attendants. By the way, I often wonder who these attendants were. Of course there were no professional nurses, and the nursing seems to have been done partly by slaves and partly by the pupils of the physician, medical students as we should call them, it being not unusual for the doctor to leave one of these behind to attend to the patient and carry out any medical orders.
The physician was encouraged to be a philosopher, in the sense that his attitude towards his patients was to be serious, honest and kindly. The characteristics of a philosopher are thus given: disinterestedness, modesty, judgment, firmness, purity, strict morality, freedom from superstition.
One of the most important points of etiquette for an ancient Greek physician was the question of fees. In modern times there is a more or less regular scale of charges, and a patient can form a shrewd guess what an illness will cost him. As to ancient Greece, let us listen to the author of Precepts.
"This piece of advice is of importance. Do not begin by worrying the patient about your fee. If you do, you will arouse in the patient a suspicion that unless he agrees to your terms you will go away and leave him to his fate. So do not concentrate your attention on fixing what your fee is to be. A worry of this nature is likely to harm the patient, particularly if the disease be an acute one. Hold fast to reputation rather than profit. It is better to reproach patients you have saved than to distress men who are at death's door."-Chapter IV. services for nothing, remembering a past service or your present reputation. If you can help a stranger wlho is in need, do your best for all such. For where the love of imlan-] is there is also the love of the art. Some patients are helped to recover from a serious illness bh realizinig that their physiciani is a good man." C7hapter VI.
We admire the spirit of the writer. At the same time it is easy to see that degrading scenes were not uncommon at the bedside of a sufferer. They were doubtless aggravated by the Greek's love of an argument, and his delight in haggling.
In one very striking case ancient medical etiquette was anti-social, and did not look to the good of the sick, but to that of the individual physician or surgeon. Nowadays all discoveries in surgery or medicine must be made public property. A new surgical method or an improved vaccine must not be patented. The principle underlying this rule is that if the novelty be bad, the patentee becomes at once a quack; if on the other hand it be good, the general welfare must override any pecuniary benefits which in other spheres of life would be the natural reward of the discoverer or inventor. Secrecy is condemned. But in ancient times things were different. Our informant is Galen, but as he is commenting on a passage in the Hippocratic collection, and explaining it, the practice lhe is referring to must be ancient. AMoreover, although surgery is in question there is no reason to suppose that the rule did not apply to medicine. The custom I refer to is that of concealing as much of the body as possible during operations. Galen assures us that this was to prevent other practitioners from learning any secret methods the operator did not want them to know. The context does not imply the slightest condemnation; in fact the custom is considered quite fair and reasonable.
It is unnecessary to point out that it was the natural outcome of the want of corporate unity and of an organized profession. The indiviclualism of the profession in ancient times, while permitting or even encouraging a high standard of medical ethics in many respects, was no protection against the mercenary greed of the ordinary btusiness man. The Greek did not fully realize that medicine is not a business but a profession.
The Hippocratic Oath forbids the plhysician to tell tales, and it is expressly stated that the rule applies whether it be in practice or whether it be in private life that the information is acquired. It is true that the saving clause is added, " whatever it is not lawful to divulge," implying that there were some things, learnt in practice and out of practice, which in certain circumstances might be made public property. We do not know what these exceptions were, and it would be idle to guess. But in two respects medical etiquette has changed since the time of the Oath: (1) Nowadays silence is restricted to facts learnt in the course of practice; (2) within these limits the rule has no exceptions.
The change is a most interesting one. In early times it was seen that reserve in these matters was wise, while at the same time some discretion was allowed. So long as the only sanction of etiquette was a sense of decorum such width of scope and such vague laxity of application was not only natural but almost necessary. But in modern coniditions greater rigidity is essential.
The violation of etiquette may bring serious consequences to the practitioner. Medical jurisprudence was unknown in ancient times, but is now a real force. The law of the land in many cases does not uphold the doctor's claim to keep silence. So it is felt that a clearer definition of the physician's duty is absolutely necessary. It is unfair--unfair to both practitioner and patient-to allow the former to exercise his own discretion. His way must be mapped out for him, and he must be freed from the responsibility of deciding what he may divulge and what he may not.
I have tried in these rather random notes to lay stress upon the main differences between ancient and modern medical etiquette. They seem to me to converge on one point-in ancient times etiquette was a question of decency, of love of the profession, and the practitioner was at liberty to conform, or .not to conform, at his own discretion. One of our authorities, the little tract Law, notices with regret the absence of external pressure. In modern times there is, besides this sanction, external pressure, applied in the name of the whole profession by the General Medical Council. The consequence of this difference is most important. It may, however, be summed up in one sentence: the legitimate practitioner is in one class, the quack is in another. Between the two there is a great gulf fixed. But in ancient times there was no such gulf. There was quackery and there was scientific medicine, but they shaded into one another. A man might be an excellent physician, but in part a quack, and his quackery would be condoned as a venial fault. Quackery, to a greater or less degree, pervaded medical practice except the highest manifestations of it, and scientific medicine leavened most of the quackery. The medical man was partly a quack, and the quack was at least very often in part a scientific physician. Of course at either ends of the line were pure quacks and purely scientific doctors, but between was a majority belonging neither to one class nor yet to the other. Again and again in our authorities we read protests against lack of long and thorough training, the implication being that an ignorant physician will be more of a quack than a scientifically trained man.
Such a state of affairs was bad for both the profession and the general public. The elimination of quackery is essential for the progress of medicine. A quack may do good by chance and accident, but ultimately quackery means harm and pain, and scientific medicine, in spite of its mistakes, means ultimately the conquest of disease and its consequences. The medical profession has no higher duty than the suppression of quackery.
Of course mere etiquette could not suppress quackery without a strictly guarded permission to practise, granted only after long training and severe tests. In ancient times all such tests were lacking. State doctors had to prove their qualifications, but so far as we know no tests were required before a man was allowed to treat private patients. There were no medical degrees. We learn from the Oath that at some period at least efforts were made to limit instruction in medicine to something that approximated to a guild; but there was nothing to prevent a man who did not belong to it from practising, if he could find patients. This is only another example of the general laxity prevalent in ancient times in all things pertaining to the government of the profession. This laxity, as I have already stated, accounts for the width of ancient etiquette and for the only sanction that supported it, the respect and love of the craftsman for his art.
